



FIX THE FUTURE?

4th PPRI Conference: Medicines access challenge – The
value of pricing and reimbursement policies
Vienna, 23-24 October 2019

Valérie Paris, OECD



I have no conflict of interest to declare



Challenges for policy makers




- **Launch prices increasing in some therapeutic areas (oncology, rare diseases)**
- ***Not always* associated great health improvements**
- **Increases in list prices** of existing on-patent medicines (U.S.)
- **Sharp price increases for some off-patent products**
- Some unmet medical needs **are not adequately addressed** by current investments in R&D
- **Uncertainties on clinical benefits of medicines with early approval**



Sustainability: Share of retail pharmaceutical spending in GDP stable (on average) over the past decade

Retail pharmaceutical expenditure, as share of GDP, 2007-2017




Notes: Retail pharmaceutical expenditure includes medical non-durables. * latest year available 2016; ** 2014; *** first year available 2010
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2019.



Sustainability: Pharmaceutical expenditures in hospitals increasing faster in several countries


Total pharmaceutical expenditure, as share of GDP, in 2017



Total pharmaceutical expenditure not reported by all OECD countries

Hospital pharmaceutical expenditure account for 6% to 44% of total pharmaceutical expenditures

Average annual growth 2007-2017



And is growing faster than retail pharmaceutical expenditures in many countries



Guiding principles to develop policy options to respond to challenges

- Overall objective: **increase value** (efficiency) of spending on pharmaceuticals
- **Maintain differential (or tiered) pricing.**
- Implement a **rule-based, predictable, system.**
- **Foster competition** throughout the pharmaceutical system in order to improve the value of pharmaceutical spending
- **Increase transparency** to restore trust in the system.



Policy options to respond to current challenges


**Restore trust
and dialogue
between
industry and
other
stakeholders**



**Reduce the
costs of R&D
and
accelerate
market
access**



**Improve
efficiency of
pharma
spending
and
determine
WTP**



**Develop new
types of push
and pull
incentives**





Restoring trust and dialogue between industry and other stakeholders

- **Publishing authoritative information on industry activities and the risks, costs and returns from R&D.**
- **Increasing price transparency in pharmaceutical markets.**
- **Improving horizon scanning activities and encouraging co-operation at regional level.**



Reducing R&D costs, accelerate access

- **Harmonising regulatory requirements, encourage mutual recognition.**
- **Accelerating market access for medicines with significant potential benefit.** Ensure compliance of companies with post-marketing evidence requirements and appropriate patient information.



Reduction in R&D costs is necessary but will not automatically translate in price reductions



Increasing pharma spending efficiency

- Facilitating cooperation in health technology assessment (HTA).
- Encouraging cooperation in price negotiations, contracting or procurement.
- **Determining willingness to pay for new treatments**
- Assessing the performance of medicines in routine clinical practice and adjust coverage conditions and prices.
- **Optimising the use of performance-based agreements**
- Promoting competition in on-patent markets, notably through tendering by indication.
- Promoting competition in off-patent markets: **accelerate generic market entry**
- (Exploring bundled payments for episodes of care in oncology.




Determining willingness to pay for new treatments

Defining consensual, explicit and firm criteria for coverage and pricing.

- Fair and transparent decision-making process
- WTP may differ across therapeutic areas and across countries
- Consider clinical value, severity, budget impact.

Example of differential ICER thresholds for severity




Note: X-axis represents the burden of disease expressed as “proportional shortfalls”.

Source: Adapted from Stolk et al., 2004) and Zwaap et al. (2015).



Optimising the use of performance-based agreements

- Limit to products with high uncertainty on clinical benefits or cost-effectiveness;
- Harmonise outcomes definition and measurement
- Make sure new knowledge is shared beyond parties to the agreement
- Better design agreements to create incentives for manufacturers to generate new knowledge





Developing and adjusting pull and push incentives to encourage innovations in areas with unmet needs

- **Better targeting push incentives** to the development of unmet medical needs and attach access conditions to public funding of development.
- **Continue to explore market entry rewards** (pull incentives) to encourage R&D for unmet medical needs.
- **Consider amending orphan drug legislation.** To better target drugs whose development would not occur without such incentives



Staying in touch with the Health Division



Valérie Paris

Valerie.paris@oecd.org



Follow us on Twitter

@OECD_social



Visit our website

<http://www.oecd.org/health>

New release in OECD Health Policy Studies series

Pharmaceutical Innovation and Access to Medicines

Available since 29 November 2018

<http://www.oecd.org/health/pharmaceutical-innovation-and-access-to-medicines-9789264307391-en.htm>

